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Abstract—Information security is an important issue in vehic-
ular networks as the accuracy and integrity of information is a
prerequisite to satisfactory performance of almost all vehicular
network applications. In this paper, we study the information
security of a vehicular ad hoc network whose message may
be tampered by malicious vehicles. An analytical framework is
developed to analyze the process of message dissemination in a
vehicular network with malicious vehicles randomly distributed
in the network. The probability that a destination vehicle at a
fixed distance away can receive the message correctly from the
source vehicle is obtained. Simulations are conducted to validate
the accuracy of the theoretical analysis. Our results demonstrate
the impact of network topology and the distribution of malicious
vehicles on the correct delivery of a message in vehicular ad
hoc networks, and may provide insight on the design of security
mechanisms to improve the security of message dissemination in
vehicular networks.
Index Terms—Vehicular ad hoc networks, message dissemina-
tion, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Interest is surging on vehicular networks and Internet-of-
vehicles technologies due to their increasingly important role
in improving road traffic efficiency, enhancing road safety
and providing real-time information to drivers and passengers
[1]. By deploying wireless communication infrastructure along
the roadside (e.g., road-side units (RSU)), equipping vehi-
cles with on-board communication facilities (e.g., on-board
units (OBU)), and with the assistance of dedicated short-
range communication (DSRC) [2] and LTE technology, two
wireless communication modes: vehicle-to-infrastructure and
vehicle-to-vehicle communications, are supported in vehicular
networks. Through wireless communications, messages can
be disseminated for vehicular network applications, including
safety applications requiring real-time information about traffic
accidents, traffic congestion or obstacles in the road, and
non-safety applications such as offering value-added services
(e.g., digital maps with real-time traffic status) and in-car
entertainment services [3].
Coming together with the convenience and advantage of
wireless communications is the potential security threat that
vehicular networks may present to transportation systems. Dif-
ferent from traditional security settings, in vehicular networks,
information collection and dissemination are conducted by
distributed vehicles. Quite often, information may be generated
by or received from a vehicle that has never been encoun-
tered before. This may render traditional security mechanisms,
largely based on cryptography and key management, or trust
management, futile in vehicular networks. The situation is fur-
ther exacerbated by the highly dynamic topology of vehicular
networks where the connections may emerge opportunistically
between vehicles and the associated network topology is con-
stantly changing [4]. All these features of vehicular networks
pose unique challenges for vehicular network security and
make vehicular networks prone to attacks by malicious and/or
selfish attackers who may spread false messages, tamper or
drop the received messages. These security threats are likely
to result in severe consequences like traffic congestion, traffic
crash, even loss of lives and must be thoroughly investigated
before vehicular networks can be deployed.
In this paper, we study information security of vehicular ad
hoc networks (VANETs), where the message may be tampered
by malicious vehicles randomly distributed in the network,
by investigating the probability that a destination vehicle
at a fixed distance away can receive the message correctly
from the source vehicle. Specifically, consider that a vehicle
(i.e., the source vehicle) detecting an abnormal situation, e.g.,
traffic accident, slippery road and congestion, sends a message
informing other vehicles of the situation. The message is
forwarded from the source vehicle in a multi-hop manner
to other vehicles. We analyze the probability that a vehicle
at a fixed distance away, termed the destination vehicle, can
receive the message correctly from the source vehicle in the
presence of malicious vehicles in between, which may modify
the transmitted message. The novelty and major contributions
of this paper are summarized as follows:
1) We develop for the first time an analytical framework to
model the process of message dissemination in vehicular
ad hoc networks in the presence of malicious vehicles
randomly distributed in the network. The probability
that a message is delivered correctly from the source
vehicle to a destination vehicle at a fixed distance away
is analyzed.
2) Simulations are conducted to establish the accuracy of
the analysis. Using the analysis, relationship is revealed
between key parameters such as the probability of
correct message reception and its major performance-
impacting parameters. Discussions are presented on the
impact of network topology and the distribution of ma-
licious vehicles on secure message delivery in vehicular
networks.
3) Our results may provide insight on the design of security
mechanisms, particularly secure routing algorithms and
2topology control algorithms, to improve informations
security in vehicular networks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews related work. Section III introduces the system model
and the problem formation. Theoretical analysis is presented
in Section IV. In Section V, we conduct simulations to validate
the accuracy of our analysis and discuss its insight. Section
VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
For secure message dissemination in vehicular networks,
two major factors need to be considered: the trustworthiness of
each vehicle and the integrity of the transmitted message. Ac-
cordingly, three misbehavior detection schemes are commonly
adopted for secure message dissemination: entity-centric mis-
behavior detection scheme, data-centric misbehavior detection
scheme, and a combined use of both. In the following, we will
review the works on these three schemes separately.
Entity-centric misbehavior detection schemes focus on as-
sessing the trustworthiness level of each vehicle to filter out
the malicious vehicles. The assessment process is commonly
conducted at each vehicle by monitoring their instantaneous
neighbors’ behavior. In [5], Gazdar et al. proposed a dynamic
and distributed trust model to formalize a trust relationship
between vehicles and filter out malicious and selfish vehicles.
Their trust model is based on the use of a Markov chain
to evaluate the evolution of the trust value. In [6], instead
of allowing all vehicles to assess trustworthiness, Khan et
al. proposed a novel malicious node detection algorithm for
VANETs, which optimizes the selection of assessors to im-
prove the overall network performance. In [7], Haddadou et
al. proposed a distributed trust model for VANETs, which
was motivated by the job market signaling model. Their trust
model is able to gradually detect all malicious nodes as
well as boosting the cooperation of selfish nodes. In [8], to
overcome the challenges of intermittent and ad hoc monitoring
and assessment processes caused by the high mobility and
rapid topology change in vehicular networks, Sedjelmaci et
al. proposed a lightweight intrusion detection framework with
the help of a clustering algorithm, where nodes are grouped
into highly stable clusters so that the monitoring and assess-
ment processes can be better conducted in a relatively stable
environment.
Data-centric misbehavior detection schemes focus on the
consistency check of the disseminated data to filter out the
false data. In [9], Dietzel et al. argued that redundant data for-
warding paths are the most promising technique for effective
data consistency check in a multi-hop information dissemina-
tion environment, and proposed three graph-theoretic metrics
to measure the redundancy of dissemination protocols. In [10],
Raya et al. proposed a framework for vehicular networks to
establish data-centric trust, and evaluated the effectiveness
of four data fusion rules: majority voting, weighted voting,
Bayesian inference and belief propagation based techniques.
In [11], Huang et al. firstly demonstrated that information
cascading and oversampling adversely affect the performance
of trust management scheme in VANETs, and then proposed
a novel voting scheme that taking the distance between the
transmitter and receiver into account when assigning weight
to the trust level of the received data. In [12], Zaidi et al.
proposed and evaluated a rogue node detection system for
VANETs using statistical techniques to determine whether the
received data are false. In [13], Radak applied a so-called
cautious operator to deal with data received from different
sources to detect dangerous events on the road. Their adopted
cautious operator is an extension of the Demper-Shafer theory
that is known to be superior in handling data come from
dependent sources.
A combined use of entity-centric and data-centric misbehav-
ior detection scheme makes use of both the trust level of vehi-
cles and the consistency of received data to detect misbehaving
vehicles and filter out incorrect messages. Works adopting the
combined scheme are limited. In [14], Dhurandher proposed
a security algorithm using both node reputation and data
plausibility checks to protect the network against attacks.
The reputation value is obtained by both direct monitoring
and indirect recommendation from neighbors; and the data
consistency check is conducted by comparing the received data
with the sensed data by the vehicle’s own sensors. In [15], Li
et al. proposed an attack-resistant trust management scheme
to evaluate the trustworthiness of both data and vehicles in
VANETs, and to detect and cope with malicious attacks.
They adopted the Dempster-Shafer theory to combine the data
received from different sources, and then used this combined
result to update the trust value of vehicles.
In summary, all the above works on security issues in
vehicular networks focused on trust model establishment, trust
model management, or methods to assess data from different
sources to check their consistency, with a goal of detecting
misbehaving nodes in the network. Our work is different
from theirs in that we focus on theoretically characterizing
the probability of correct message reception, and evaluate
the impact of network topology and distribution of malicious
vehicles on the probability.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMATION
A. Network Model
We consider a vehicular ad hoc network on a highway
with bi-directional traffic flows. Vehicles in both directions
are distributed randomly following Poisson point processes
[16], [17] with spatial densities ρ1 and ρ2 respectively. As
a ready consequence of the superposition property of Poisson
processes [18], all vehicles on the highway are also Poissonly
distributed with density ρ = ρ1 + ρ2. In actual road networks,
there may be multiple lanes in each direction. Considering
that the width of a lane is typically small compared with the
transmission range of vehicles, we ignore the road width and
model multiple lanes in the same direction as one lane [16],
[19].
B. Wireless Communication Model
We consider a general wireless connection model [20],
where a receiver separated by a Euclidean distance x
from a transmitter receives the message successfully with
3a probability g(x), independent of transmissions by other
transmitter-receiver pairs. There are two constraints on g(x):
1) it is a monotonic non-increasing function of x and 2)
limx→∞ g(x) = 0. This general wireless connection model
includes a number of widely-used wireless connection models
as its special cases. For instance, when g(x) assumes the
following form
g(x) =
{
1, 0 < x ≤ r
0, x > r
, (1)
it becomes the widely known unit disk model where a pair of
wireless nodes are directly connected when their Euclidean
distance is smaller than or equal to a threshold r, known
as the transmission range. Alternatively, when g(x) takes the
following form,
g(x) =
1
2
(
1− erf
(
10α log10
(
x
r
)
√
2σ2
))
, (2)
it becomes another widely known log-normal connection
model [21]–[23], where α is the path loss exponent, σ is the
standard deviation and r is the equivalent transmission range
when σ = 0.
We consider a network with a sufficiently large vehicu-
lar density such that the generated vehicular network is a
connected network [21]. Besides, broadcast transmission is
adopted so that each message can be received by multiple
vehicles to increase the number of redundant data forwarding
paths and reduce the message dissemination time. Further-
more, we assume that time is divided into time slots of equal
length τ, and τ is sufficiently small such that we can regard
vehicles as almost stationary during each time slot. After the
message dissemination process begins, at each time slot, a
vehicle among the set of vehicles that 1) have received at
least one message and 2) are yet to transmit the message,
is randomly chosen to broadcast its received message. Such
broadcast protocol can be readily implemented in a distributed
manner by having each vehicle waits a random amount of
time identically and independently distributed following an
exponential distribution before transmitting its received mes-
sage. Each vehicle only transmits its received message once.
Note that the radio propagation speed is much faster than
the moving speed of vehicles [24]. Therefore, we ignore the
information propagation delay in this paper and assume that
during the message dissemination process, the topology of the
vehicular network remains unchanged.
C. Malicious Vehicle distribution and Data Fusion Rule
We assume that vehicles along the highway can be clas-
sified into two categories: normal vehicles, which behave
normally and will forward the received message without any
alteration, and malicious vehicles, which may tamper the
received message and alter its content. Beside, we assume
that the probability of each vehicle being a malicious vehicle
is pm, independent of the event that another distinct vehicle
is a malicious vehicle. We further assume that the malicious
vehicles act in a distributed manner and there is no central
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Fig. 1. An illustration of the sub-network we focused on in this work, which
starts from the location of vehicle VS and ends at the location of destination
vehicle VD .
coordination among malicious vehicles. As a consequence of
the assumption, each malicious vehicle simply modifies the
received message without evaluation of the true content of the
message.
Following the broadcast dissemination scheme considered
in the paper, each vehicle is likely to receive multiple copies
of a message from different vehicles before it broadcasts
the message. Due to the existence of malicious vehicles, the
received messages may not be the same. For example, one
vehicle may detect a traffic incident and generate a message
alerting other vehicles but this message may be modified by
a malicious vehicle. In the situation of conflicting messages
being received, a majority voting rule is employed by each
vehicle to fuse their received messages. That is, the normal
vehicle will broadcast the message in agreement with the most
number of vehicles and discard the message conflicting with
majority opinion, and the malicious vehicle will broadcast the
message conflicting with the majority opinion. When a tie
occurs, all the vehicles will randomly choose one of the two
messages (true or false message) with equal probability to
broadcast. The simplicity of the majority voting rule allows
us to focus on the topological impact of vehicular networks
on the correct message delivery. It is part of our future work
plan to investigate the optimum fusion rule for highly dynamic
vehicular networks.
D. Problem Formation
Given the aforementioned background, we are now ready
to give a formal definition of the problem considered in this
paper.
Consider a vehicle, termed the source vehicle VS , detects
an accident in front of it and wants to deliver a warning
message to vehicles traveling in the same direction as VS
and behind VS in that direction. Designate the location of
VS at the time instant when it broadcasts the message as the
origin, and the direction of information propagation (in the
opposite direction of the travel direction of VS) as the positive
direction. We want to investigate the probability that a vehicle,
termed the destination vehicle VD, located at distance L away
from VS can receive the message of VS correctly. We denote
by G(L, ρ, g) the sub-network we focus on, which is within
the road segment (0, L), and with vehicular density ρ and a
wireless connection model g. See Fig. 1 for an illustration.
Two kinds of messages are considered in this paper, +1
represents the true message (e.g., road is congested) and −1
4represents the false message (e.g., road is not congested).
Here we assume that the source vehicle VS is a normal
vehicle, namely, the message broadcast by the source vehicle
VS is true. For malicious vehicles, as there are no central
coordination among them, there is no way for a malicious
vehicle to know the true content of the message. Therefore, it
is assumed that a malicious vehicle simply modify the content
of whatever message it receives (against the outcome of the
majority voting rule), i.e., changing +1 to −1 and −1 to +1.
Finally, the destination vehicle VD conducts its majority
voting process after it has received all messages, or equiva-
lently after no further message is received after a long time
period. Denote by MD the concluded message after VD has
completed its data fusion. In this paper, we are interested in
investigating the probability that the destination vehicle VD
receives the correct message, denoted by Psucc, which can be
expressed as follows:
Psucc = Pr(MD = 1) (3)
IV. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we will present our analysis on the probabil-
ity that the destination vehicle receives the message correctly.
From the definition of the probability of correct message
reception, which is given in (3), Psucc can be expressed
as follows as an easy consequence of the total probability
theorem:
Psucc =Pr(MD = 1)
=
∞∑
n=1
Pr(MD = 1|N = n) Pr(N = n) (4)
where N denotes the random number of vehicles located in
the sub-network G(L, ρ, g). Due to the Poisson distribution of
vehicles, we have
Pr(N = n) =
(ρL)ne−ρL
n!
. (5)
Recall that in our system, the source vehicle VS located at
the origin broadcasts its message first. After that, at each time
slot, a vehicle among the set of vehicles having received at
least one message and having not broadcast its message is ran-
domly chosen to broadcast. Denote by Vi the ith vehicle that
broadcasts the message and denote its location by Yi, where
Yi ∈ (0, L) , i = 1, 2, ...n is a random variable representing
the location of the ith vehicle broadcasting its message. We
designate the source vehicle VS as the 0th broadcast vehicle
and its location is y0 = 0. It follows that the destination vehicle
VD then becomes the (n + 1)th broadcast vehicle. Using the
total probability theorem, the conditional probability that the
destination vehicle VD receives the correct message (after its
fusion), given there are N = n vehicles located in the sub-
network G(L, ρ, g), can be calculated by
Pr(MD = 1|N = n)
=
ˆ L
0
· · ·
ˆ L
0
ˆ L
0
Pr(MD = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, ...Yn = yn)
× fY1,Y2,...Yn(y1, y2, ...yn)dy1dy2...dyn (6)
where fY1,Y2,...Yn(y1, y2, ...yn) is the joint distribution (prob-
ability density function) of the locations of the 1st, 2nd, ...,
and nth broadcast vehicles.
Combining (4) - (6), it can be shown that to obtain the
correct message reception probability Psucc, it remains to cal-
culate the conditional probability that the destination vehicle
VD receives the message correctly given that the ith broadcast
vehicle is located at yi, i = 1, 2, ...n, i.e., Pr(MD = 1|Y1 =
y1, Y2 = y2, ...Yn = yn), and the joint distribution of the
locations of the 1st, 2nd, ..., and nth broadcast vehicles, i.e.,
fY1,Y2,...Yn(y1, y2, ...yn). In the following, we will calculate
these two terms separately.
A. Calculation of Pr(MD = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, ...Yn = yn)
Denote by h(yi), i = 0, 1, ...n the indicator function that
represents whether the destination vehicle VD receives the
message sent by the ith broadcast vehicle Vi located at Yi = yi.
Following the general wireless connection model considered
in the paper, it can be readily shown that
h(yi) =
{
1, g (L− yi)
0, 1− g (L− yi)
, i = 0, 1, ...n. (7)
Denote by Mi the message broadcast by the ith broadcast
vehicle Vi located at yi, i = 0, 1, ...n. It follows that M0 = 1
as we regard the source vehicle VS is a normal vehicle
that broadcasts the true message, and each Mi, i = 1, ...n
is a binary random variable taking value from {+1,−1}.
Assuming the majority voting rule, the conditional probability
that the destination vehicle VD receives the message correctly
given that the ith broadcast vehicle is located at yi, i = 1, ...n,
can be calculated by:
Pr(MD = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, ...Yn = yn)
=Pr
(
n∑
i=0
Mih(yi) > 0
)
+
1
2
Pr
(
n∑
i=0
Mih(yi) = 0
)
=
2n+1∑
j=1
[
Pr
(
n∑
i=0
Mih
j(yi) > 0
)
Pr
(
h = hj
)]
+
1
2
2n+1∑
j=1
[
Pr
(
n∑
i=0
Mih
j(yi) = 0
)
Pr
(
h = hj
)]
=
2n+1∑
j=1
{
Pr
(
n∑
i=0
Mih
j(yi) > 0
)
×
[
n∏
i=0
[
g (L− yi)hj(yi) + (1− g (L− yi))
(
1− hj(yi)
)]]}
+
1
2
2n+1∑
j=1
{
Pr
(
n∑
i=0
Mih
j(yi) = 0
)
×
[
n∏
i=0
[
g (L− yi)hj(yi) + (1− g (L− yi))
(
1− hj(yi)
)]]}
(8)
where the vector h is defined by h =
{h(y0), h(y1), ...h(yn) : h(yi) ∈ {1, 0}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and
5the first step follows from the rule of majority voting,
particularly noting that when a tie occurs, the destination
vehicle will make a decision randomly with equal probability.
The second step is obtained by using the total probability
theorem on h. Note from (7) that each h(yi), i = 0, 1, ...n
is a binary random variable. Therefore, the vector
h = {h(y0), h(y1), ...h(yn)} can have 2n+1 possible values
and we let h = hj , j = 1, 2, ...2n+1 represents each possible
value. The third step follows by plugging Pr
(
h = hj
)
=∏n
i=0
[
g (L− yi)hj(yi) + (1− g (L− yi))
(
1− hj(yi)
)]
,
which readily results from the definition of each
h(yi), i = 0, 1, ...n given as (7).
From (8), to calculate Pr(MD = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 =
y2, ...Yn = yn), it remains to calculate the two terms
Pr
(∑n
i=0Mih
j(yi) > 0
)
and Pr
(∑n
i=0Mih
j(yi) = 0
)
given each fixed hj =
{
hj(y0), h
j(y1), ...h
j(yn)
}
,
j = 1, 2, ...2n+1. Using the joint distribution of M1,
M2, ... Mn, Pr (M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mn = mn), the
above two terms can be obtained as follows:
Pr
(
n∑
i=0
Mih
j(yi) > 0
)
=
∑
∑
n
i=0 mih
j(yi)>0
Pr (M0 = m0,M1 = m1, ...Mn = mn)
=
∑
hj(0)+
∑
n
i=1
mihj(yi)>0
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mn = mn) , (9)
and
Pr
(
n∑
i=0
Mih
j(yi) = 0
)
=
∑
∑
n
i=0 mih
j(yi)=0
Pr (M0 = m0,M1 = m1, ...Mn = mn)
=
∑
hj(0)+
∑
n
i=1 mih
j(yi)=0
Pr (M1 = m1, ...Mn = mn) . (10)
According to the chain rule of probability, it can be read-
ily obtained that the joint distribution of M1,M2 ... Mn,
Pr (M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mn = mn) is given by
Pr (M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mn = mn)
=Pr (Mn = mn|Mn−1 = mn−1, ...M2 = m2,M1 = m1)×
Pr (Mn−1 = mn−1|Mn−2 = mn−2, ...M2 = m2,M1 = m1)
× ...× Pr (M2 = m2|M1 = m1) Pr(M1 = m1). (11)
Note that the message fusion result of vehicle Vi is depen-
dent on the messagesM0, M1, ... Mi−1 broadcast by vehicles
VS , V1, ...Vi−1. Therefore, the conditional distribution of each
Mi, i = 1, 2, ...n given M1 = m1, ...Mi−1 = mi−1 can be
obtained as follows:
Pr (Mi = 1|M0 = 1,M1 = m1, ...Mi−1 = mi−1)
=Pr

1 + i−1∑
j=1
(mj · g(yi − yj)) > 0

 (1− pm)
+ Pr

1 + i−1∑
j=1
(mj · g(yi − yj)) < 0

 pm
+
1
2
Pr

1 + i−1∑
j=1
(mj · g(yi − yj)) = 0

 (12)
and
Pr(Mi = −1|M0 = 1,M1 = m1, ...Mi−1 = mi−1)
=1− Pr (Mi = 1|M0 = 1,M1 = m1, ...Mi−1 = mi−1) ,
(13)
where the three terms in (12) are the probabilities that vehicle
Vi broadcasts message +1 under three different cases: 1 +∑i−1
j=1 (mj · g(yi − yj)) > 0, 1+
∑i−1
j=1 (mj · g(yi − yj)) < 0,
and 1 +
∑i−1
j=1 (mj · g(yi − yj)) = 0 separately. Using the
first case 1 +
∑i−1
j=1 (mj · g(yi − yj)) > 0 as an example
to illustrate: when 1 +
∑i−1
j=1 (mj · g(yi − yj)) > 0, vehicle
Vi would conclude from its majority voting process that the
majority opinion of the message is +1. Considering each
vehicle has probability pm to modify the message (being a
malicious vehicle), therefore, the probability for the vehicle to
broadcast the correct concluded message (from the majority
voting process) +1 would be 1− pm, which leads to the term
Pr
(
1 +
∑i−1
j=1 (mj · g(yi − yj)) > 0
)
(1 − pm). Specifically,
from (12), when i = 1 we have
Pr (M1 = 1) = 1− pm, (14)
and
Pr (M1 = −1) = pm, (15)
which can also be readily obtained as the 1st broadcast vehicle
only receives the true message from the source vehicle.
Combining (11) - (13), we can obtain the joint distribution
of M1, M2, ... Mn, Pr (M1 = m1,M2 = m2, ...Mn = mn).
Plugging this joint distribution in (9) and (10), the two terms
Pr
(∑n
i=0Mih
j(yi) > 0
)
and Pr
(∑n
i=0Mih
j(yi) = 0
)
in
(8) can be obtained, which in turn leads to the result of
Pr(MD = 1|Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, ...Yn = yn).
B. Calculation of fY1,Y2,...Yn(y1, y2, ...yn)
Let Km,m = 0, 1, ...n be the set of vehicles in the sub-
network G(L, ρ, g) which have received at least one message
after themth broadcast vehicle Vm has broadcast its messages.
Given the location of the ith broadcast vehicle Vi as Yi =
yi, i = 0, 1, ...m, a vehicle located at x, x 6= yi, i = 0, 1, ...m
belongs to Km implies that it connects to at least one vehicle
that are located at y0, y1, ...ym, which has the probability
1 −∏mi=0 (1− g (|x− yi|)). Note that the (m + 1)th broad-
cast vehicle Vm+1 is randomly chosen from the vehicle set
Km\{V1, ...Vm}, therefore, given each Yi = yi, i = 1, 2, ...m,
the location of (m + 1)th broadcast vehicle Ym+1 has the
conditional probability density function as follows:
fYm+1|Y1,Y2,...Ym(x|y1, y2, ...ym)
=
1−∏mi=0 (1− g (|x− yi|))´ L
0 [1−
∏m
i=0 (1− g (|x− yi|))] dx
, m = 0, 1, ...n− 1
(16)
Eq. (16) is valid when x 6= yi, i = 1, 2, ...m as we assume
each vehicle only broadcasts once. Particularly, when m = 0,
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Fig. 2. A comparison between analytical result and simulation result.
we have the probability density function of the 1st broadcast
vehicle’s location
fY1(x) =
g(x)´ L
0
g(x)dx
. (17)
As an easy consequence of the chain rule of probability, the
joint distribution of Y1, Y2, ...Yn can be obtained as follows:
fY1,Y2,...Yn(y1, y2, ...yn)
=fYn|Yn−1,...Y2,Yn−1(yn|yn−1, ..., y2, y1)
× fYn−1|Yn−2,..Y2,Y1(yn−1|yn−2, ..., y2y1)
× fYn−2|Yn−3,...Y2,Y1,(yn−2|yn−3, ...y2, y1)× ...
× fY2|Y1(y2|y1)× fY1(y1), (18)
where each conditional distribution in (18) is given by (16).
V. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, numerical and simulation results are shown
to discuss the relationship between the probability of cor-
rect message reception and its major performance-impacting
parameters. Specifically, we adopt the unit disk model and
the log-normal connection model as two special cases of
the general wireless connection model respectively in the
simulation. For the unit disk model, we set the transmission
range r = 250m (typical radio range using DSRC [25]), and
for the log-normal connection model, we set the the path loss
exponent α = 2 and the standard deviation σ = 4 [20]. Each
simulation is repeated 5000 times and the average value is
shown in the plot.
Fig. 2 shows a comparison between the analytical result and
the simulation result assuming the unit disk model, and shows
that the analytical result matches very well with the simulation
result.
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the relationship between the proba-
bility of correct message reception Psucc and the probability of
each vehicle being malicious pm assuming the unit disk model,
under different distance L between the source vehicle and the
destination vehicle, and under different vehicular density ρ
respectively. Specifically, we can see that Psucc = 1 when
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Fig. 3. The relationship between the probability of correct message reception
Psucc and the probability of each vehicle being malicious pm assuming the
unit disk model, with different distance L between the source vehicle and the
destination vehicle.
pm = 0, which corresponds to the case that all vehicles are
normal vehicles; when pm is small, Psucc decreases sharply
with an increase of pm and decreases to its minimum value
(0.5 in our system) when pm is larger than a certain threshold
pth, e.g., pth = 0.2 when L = 3km and ρ = 0.05veh/m.
Beyond that threshold, a further increase in pm has little
impact on Psucc. This can be explained by the fact that when
pm < pth, the number of malicious vehicles in the network is
small. Therefore, an increase in pm will largely increase the
number of malicious vehicles, which consequently, leads to a
sharp decrease in the probability of correct message reception.
When pm is larger than its threshold, malicious vehicles play
dominant roles in the majority voting scheme. In this case, for
any vehicle in the network, the outcome of its message fusion
result will be incorrect. The minimum value of Psucc = 0.5 is
due to the fact that malicious vehicles in our network simply
modify the received message without evaluation of the true
content of the message. Therefore, when pm is larger than its
threshold, the message transmitted in the network will move
between +1 and −1 back and forth, leading to the occurrence
that Psucc converges to 0.5 instead of 0.
Fig. 3 shows that given a fixed vehicular density, when
pm < pth, a larger distance L between the source vehicle
and the destination vehicle will lead to a smaller Psucc. This
is due to the fact that other things being equal, a larger L
implies a larger number of malicious vehicles participating in
tampering the message transmitted from the source vehicle to
the destination vehicle. As a consequence, it leads to a smaller
Psucc.
Fig. 4 shows that in our system, a larger vehicular density
ρ has little impact on Psucc. Intuitively, a larger ρ will lead to
a larger Psucc due to the fact that a larger ρ implies a larger
number of messages received by each vehicle, which is benefi-
cial for vehicles to conduct data consistency checks. Therefore,
when the traffic density increases, the message fusion result of
each vehicle will be more accurate. Consequently, other things
being equal, the probability of correct message reception Psucc
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Fig. 4. The relationship between the probability of correct message reception
Psucc and the probability of each node being malicious pm assuming the
unit disk model, with different vehicular density ρ.
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Fig. 5. The relationship between the probability of correct message reception
Psucc and pm assuming the log-normal connection model, with different
distance L between the source vehicle and the destination vehicle.
will increase. However, when a vehicle is randomly chosen
among the set of vehicles that have received at least one
message to broadcast, it may not have received a sufficient
number messages from other vehicles to conduct a robust data
fusion. This follows that even with an increase in traffic density
ρ, the message fusion result of each broadcast vehicle does
not improve. Therefore, a larger vehicular density ρ has little
impact on the Psucc.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the relationship between the proba-
bility of correct message reception Psucc and the probability
of each vehicle being malicious pm assuming the log-normal
connection model, under different distance L between the
source vehicle and the destination vehicle, and under different
vehicular density ρ respectively. We can see that with the
increase of pm from 0 to 1, the trend of Psucc is the same
as that assuming the unit disk model. Therefore, we omit the
duplicate discussion here.
Fig. 7 gives a comparison of the correct message reception
probability Psucc achieved assuming the unit disk model
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Fig. 6. The relationship between the probability of correct message reception
Psucc and pm assuming the log-normal connection model, with different
vehicular density ρ.
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Fig. 7. A comparison between the probability of correct message reception
Psucc achieved assuming the unit disk model and that assuming the log-
normal connection model.
(labeled as UDM) and that achieved assuming the log-normal
connection model (labeled as LSM). It is shown that when
pm < pth, the system assuming the log-normal connection
model has a slightly higher correct message reception proba-
bility Psucc than that assuming the unit disk model. The reason
behind this phenomenon is that the log-normal connection
model introduces a Gaussian variation of the transmission
range around the mean value, which implies a higher chance
for the vehicles to be connected to other vehicles separated
further away. Therefore, other things being equal, each broad-
cast vehicle assuming the log-normal connection model can
receive more copies of a message from other vehicles than that
assuming the unit disk model, which leads to a better message
fusion result for each vehicle and consequently, results in a
higher correct message reception probability.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied a vehicular ad hoc network where a
certain fraction of vehicles are malicious vehicles and these
8malicious vehicles are distributed randomly in the network.
Furthermore, there is no central coordination among these
malicious vehicles and consequently a malicious vehicle sim-
ply modify its received message irrespective of its true value.
An analytical framework is developed to model the process
of secure message dissemination in the network, and the
probability that a vehicle, located at a fixed distance away
from the source vehicle, can receive the message correctly is
obtained. Simulations were conducted to establish the accuracy
of the analytical results and demonstrate that the probability
of correct message delivery reduces to its minimum after
the proportion of malicious vehicles in the network increases
beyond a threshold. Besides, a smaller distance between the
destination vehicle and the source vehicle will lead to a
larger probability of correct message reception. Our results
may provide insight on the design of security mechanisms,
particularly secure routing algorithms and topology control
algorithms, to enhance secure message dissemination in highly
dynamic vehicular networks.
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